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G A B R I E L  S .  M E N D L O W  
The Moral Ambiguity of Public Prosecution 
abstract.  Classic crimes like the� and assault are in the first instance wrongs against indi-
viduals, not against the state or the polity that it represents. Yet our legal system denies crime 
victims the right to initiate or intervene in the criminal process, relegating them to the roles of 
witness or bystander—even as the system treats prosecution as an institutional analog of the in-
terpersonal processes of moral blame and accountability, which give pride of place to those most 
directly wronged. Public prosecution reigns supreme, with the state claiming primary and exclu-
sive moral standing to call offenders to account for their wrongs. Although likely justified all 
things considered, this legal arrangement upends the structures of accountability familiar from 
ordinary life, where the victims of wrongdoing enjoy moral standing of a caliber greater than 
that of most if not all third parties. By inverting these structures of accountability, the state that 
acts as exclusive public prosecutor exceeds its moral standing and incurs a debt to the crime vic-
tim, who retains a persisting moral complaint, even against a state that justifiably monopolizes 
the prosecution function. The victim’s persisting moral complaint is different from the well-
known grievance that a criminal legal system that marginalizes or excludes crime victims risks 
injuring their dignity and impairing their prospects for vindication and reconciliation. If the state 
showed crime victims greater solicitude and accommodated their interests and considered pref-
erences more deliberately, the criminal process might dignify victims and enhance their wellbe-
ing. But the state still would exceed its moral standing if it accommodated the victim as a matter 
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 The victim’s prerogative to call a wrongdoer to account is a widely acknowledged but little 
examined aspect of relational morality. This Essay argues that the victim’s prerogative shares a 
foundation with other more theoretically familiar norms of partiality, self-preference, and exclu-
sion, all of which reflect our status as individual persons, rather than as vectors for the promo-
tion of impartial value. Grounded in the victim’s status as an individual human person, the vic-
tim’s moral prerogative continues to exert normative force even when justifiably supplanted by 
the myriad considerations of equity and efficacy that favor public prosecution on the whole. The 
moral interests undergirding the victim’s prerogative may survive specifically in the form of rea-
sons for us to consider ceding the crime victim a degree of procedural control, much the way 
many civilian jurisdictions do. The Essay concludes by weighing this procedural innovation 
against other possible responses to the moral ambiguity of public prosecution, such as dramati-
cally reducing the severity of state punishment or replacing our existing criminal legal system 
with a bifurcated procedure that divides adjudication sharply from sanctioning, restricting moral 
blame and accountability to the adjudicatory stage and treating the sanctioning stage as a clinical 
exercise in crime reduction. If no such innovation is ultimately feasible and morally attractive, 
then the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial reductio ad absurdum of a system of exclusive 
public prosecution in which the criminal process is an institutional analog of interpersonal moral 
blame, a demonstration of the moral deficiency of a criminal legal system that holds interperson-
al wrongdoers morally accountable to the polity rather than to their direct victims. 
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introduction 
Even the shortest term of incarceration causes hardship and deprivation of 
a kind impossible to justify in almost any nonpenal context. Perhaps for this 
reason, when we examine the moral foundations of state punishment, we tend 
to focus more on the punished than on the punisher—more on what makes 
someone liable to sanctions than on what entitles the state to inflict them.1 We 
focus still less on what entitles the state to seek them, that is, to serve as crimi-
nal prosecutor. Yet the last question is just as important as the others, and it is 
just as difficult. For even if we grant that justice permits certain people to be 
punished by the state, it remains an open question whether the state, rather 
than another party, should enjoy the sole legal right to instigate the process 
that decides guilt and innocence. 
Because that process involves an element of blaming and holding morally 
accountable, the question of what entitles the state to serve as prosecutor is in 
part a question about the state’s moral standing to call supposed wrongdoers to 
account. An entity has the moral standing to call another to account when it 
has a presumptive moral entitlement to accuse the other of wrongdoing and to 
demand that the other answer the accusation by admitting or denying respon-
sibility. This presumptive entitlement is not an indefeasible right: an entity 
with the standing to call another to account is not justified in doing so when 
the consequences would be very bad. At the same time, an entity need not have 
standing to call another to account in order to be justified in doing so. Alt-
hough an entity that lacks standing is presumptively disentitled to call another 
to account, it may do so anyway if the consequences would be very good or the 
consequences of silence very bad. I will argue that this moral predicament is 
roughly that of the contemporary state. 
In terms of efficacy and fairness, public prosecution is unquestionably su-
perior to private prosecution. Yet the state may lack moral standing to call 
criminals to account for their interpersonal wrongs in a setting that excludes 
their human victims from formal participation. Classic crimes like the� and as-
sault are in the first instance wrongs against individuals, not against the state 
or the polity that it represents. But our legal system denies crime victims the 
 
1. See A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311 (1991) 
(noting that discussions of the justification of punishment tend to approach the issue as be-
ing “a question about the kind or amount of punishment that is just in response to various 
offenses, or a question about who can be justly punished, or a question about when (if) pun-
ishment is the proper response to crime or wrongdoing at all,” rather than as being a ques-
tion about “[w]hat makes it just for a particular person or group to punish us, instead of 
some other person or group”). 
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right to initiate or intervene in the criminal process, relegating victims to the 
roles of witness or bystander—even as the system treats prosecution as an insti-
tutional analog of the interpersonal processes of moral blame and accountabil-
ity, which give pride of place to those most directly wronged. Public prosecu-
tion reigns supreme, with the state claiming primary and exclusive moral 
standing to call offenders to account for their interpersonal criminal wrongdo-
ing. Although likely justified, all things considered, this legal arrangement up-
ends the structures of accountability familiar from ordinary life, where the vic-
tims of wrongdoing enjoy moral standing of a caliber greater than that of most 
if not all third parties. By inverting these structures of accountability, the state 
that acts as exclusive public prosecutor exceeds its moral standing and incurs a 
debt to the crime victim, who retains a persisting moral complaint, even 
against a state that justifiably monopolizes the prosecution function.  
The victim’s persisting moral complaint is different from (although not en-
tirely unrelated to) the familiar grievance that a criminal legal system that mar-
ginalizes or excludes crime victims risks injuring their dignity and impairing 
their prospects for vindication and reconciliation.2 If the state showed crime 
victims greater solicitude and accommodated their interests and considered 
preferences more deliberately, the criminal process would dignify victims and 
enhance their wellbeing. But the state still would exceed its moral standing if it 
accommodated the victim as a matter of benevolent grace, rather than in recog-
nition of the victim’s moral prerogative.  
The victim’s prerogative to call a wrongdoer to account is a widely acknowl-
edged but little examined aspect of relational morality. I will argue that it 
shares a foundation with other more theoretically familiar norms of partiality, 
self-preference, and exclusion, all of which reflect our status as individual per-
sons, rather than as vectors for the promotion of impartial value. Grounded in 
the victim’s status as an individual human person, the victim’s moral preroga-
tive continues to exert normative force even when justifiably supplanted by the 
considerations of equity and efficacy that favor public prosecution. 
Like the victim’s moral prerogative, the question whether the state has ex-
clusive moral standing to call interpersonal criminal wrongdoers to account is a 
topic few theorists have acknowledged, let alone sought to address. In the first 
place, few theorists have devoted sustained attention to the ways our criminal 
legal system gives institutional form to the interpersonal processes of blame 
and moral accountability. Everyone recognizes the moral character of criminal 
punishment—that the state in a criminal case imposes morally condemnatory 
 
2. See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1977) (arguing that the 
conventional criminal process “steal[s] conflicts” from victims). 
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sanctions on a defendant it judges guilty of culpable wrongdoing. But only a 
few theorists have reflected at length on the nature and implications of the 
moral character of the criminal process. The most significant of these theorists is 
R.A. Duff, who has argued compellingly that the judgment of guilt in a crimi-
nal case comes only a�er the state has engaged the defendant in what the law 
represents (and the participants tend to understand) as a relational moral 
transaction. It is a transaction in which the state claims the moral standing to 
accuse the defendant of wrongdoing and to demand that the defendant answer 
the accusation by admitting or denying moral responsibility. Theorists who pay 
little heed to these relational aspects of the criminal process can be expected to 
neglect the question why the state has moral standing to bring that process ful-
ly under its control—why the state has standing to demand that criminals an-
swer to it for wrongs they have perpetrated on others. If Duff has done more 
than other theorists to expound a relational model of the criminal process,3 it is 
no coincidence that Duff also has done more than most other theorists to ex-
plain why calling interpersonal wrongdoers to account is properly the business 
of the state.4 Duff nevertheless leaves a critical question unresolved, a question 
I will call the problem of criminal standing—namely, whether the state’s moral 
standing to call interpersonal criminal wrongdoers to account is truly exclu-
sive.5 
 
3. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 30-36 (2018) [hereina�er DUFF, REALM OF 
CRIMINAL LAW]; R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 99-143 (1986) [hereina�er DUFF, 
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS]; 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 55-161 (Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Victor Tadros 
eds., 2007). 
4. Why the state has moral standing to call perpetrators of serious interpersonal wrongdoing 
to account is a question central to Duff ’s The Realm of Criminal Law, supra note 3, an ex-
haustive discussion of the problem of criminalization. For other discussions of criminaliza-
tion that approach the issue by considering what kind of wrongdoing the state has moral 
standing to censure or what kind of wrongdoer is appropriately answerable to the state, see 
Michelle Madden Dempsey, Public Wrongs and the “Criminal Law’s Business”: When Victims 
Won’t Share, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY 
DUFF 254 (Rowan Cru�, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff eds., 2011); James Edwards & 
Andrew Simester, What’s Public About Crime?, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2017); S.E. 
Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 7 
(1998); and Gerald J. Postema, Politics Is About Grievance: Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of 
Morals, 11 LEGAL THEORY 293 (2005). 
5. In The Realm of Criminal Law, Duff treats exclusive public prosecution as a necessary con-
comitant of criminalization. See DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 294 (“For 
the time being, . . . we can take the public ownership of a case as a hallmark of criminal as 
distinct from tort (public as distinct from private) law: we will then see reason to criminal-
ize a type of wrong, rather than making it a matter of tort law, to the extent that we think it 
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The immediate task ahead6 will be to formulate the problem of criminal 
standing to a first approximation—to elucidate the concept of moral standing 
in general, to explain in broad terms why exclusive moral standing to call in-
terpersonal wrongdoers to account may elude the state, and to emphasize how 
standing differs from all-things-considered justification. From this preliminary 
discussion, it will emerge that the problem of criminal standing flows primarily 
from two sources: one institutional, the other moral. The institutional source7 
is a legal system built on the relational model of the criminal process, which 
gives legal form to the interpersonal processes of blame and accountability. The 
moral source8 is the victim-centered normative structure familiar from every-
day life that subordinates the standing of third parties to the standing of vic-
tims. The state flouts this structure and frustrates victims’ superordinate moral 
standing when it combines a relational model of the criminal process with a 
system of exclusive public prosecution. This legal practice leaves the victim 
with an unsatisfied moral claim. 
As we will see,9 the victim’s unsatisfied claim cries out for partial satisfac-
tion, even though the overall balance of reasons weighs decisively against vin-
dicating the claim in full. Although reasons of efficacy and fairness justify the 
state in arrogating an exclusive legal right to call interpersonal criminal wrong-
doers to account, the countervailing considerations that undergird a victim’s 
superordinate moral standing continue to exert normative force even when 
overridden. They survive as reasons for us to surrender a degree of procedural 
control to crime victims within a system of public prosecution, much the way 
many civilian jurisdictions do. Near the end, we will briefly weigh these insti-
tutional innovations against several other responses to the moral ambiguity of 
public prosecution available to a society committed both to a victim-centered 
conception of moral standing and to a criminal process that calls offenders to 
account for their interpersonal wrongs.10 One theoretical possibility is to pun-
ish all offenders much less severely than our system currently does, meting out 
punishments no harsher than that which a third party like the state has stand-
ing to seek. Another theoretical possibility is to replace our existing criminal 
legal system with a bifurcated procedure that divides adjudication sharply from 
 
important that the case be owned by the polity in this way—and that the defendant answer 
to the polity.”). 
6. See infra Part I. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part V. 
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sanctioning, restricting moral blame and accountability to the adjudicatory 
stage and treating the sanctioning stage as a clinical exercise in crime reduction. 
The purpose of this Essay is not to set forth a brief for a particular policy, 
however. It is to explain a neglected problem about the moral foundations of 
prosecution and to identify institutional changes that would solve or mitigate 
that problem. If none of these changes is ultimately feasible and morally attrac-
tive as an actual policy, then the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial re-
ductio ad absurdum of a system of exclusive public prosecution built on the rela-
tional model of the criminal process, a demonstration of the moral deficiency of 
a criminal legal system in which prosecution is a means of holding offenders 
morally accountable to the polity rather than to their direct victims. Alterna-
tively, the argument of this Essay is perhaps a partial reductio ad absurdum of the 
victim-centered normative ideal that drives the problem of criminal standing, 
an ideal that subordinates the moral standing of all third parties to that of a 
wrongdoer’s direct victim. If this conception of moral standing is unsound—if 
a collective third party like a political community enjoys a caliber of moral 
standing that rivals or surpasses that of a victim—then the argument of this Es-
say does not demonstrate the moral deficiency of a criminal legal system in 
which prosecution is a means of holding offenders morally accountable to the 
polity. Instead, it may help demonstrate the moral necessity of the state, the 
moral necessity of a norm-bound, formal entity authorized to censure and 
sanction serious wrongdoing on behalf of the polity. If a polity enjoys moral 
standing par excellence, but no such collective entity can sanction serious 
wrongdoing fairly and moderately unless bound by law and formal process, 
then true moral accountability may require nothing less than public prosecu-
tion. 
i .  the problem of criminal standing 
Although born of law,11 the term “standing” now figures prominently in 
the language of interpersonal morality. It denotes a kind of positional moral 
entitlement—an entitlement to hold certain others morally accountable for 
 
11. On the uncertain origins of the legal concept of standing, see JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTI-
TY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 55 (1978); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Stand-
ing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1988); and Ann Wool-
handler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691-
92 (2004). 
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their apparent wrongdoing.12 I have standing to call you to account for some 
apparently wrongful act if I have the (presumptive but defeasible) right to crit-
icize you for that act and to demand that you answer my criticism with an ap-
propriate response, such as a denial, justification, excuse, plea in mitigation, 
apology, or plea for mercy. My right to demand an answer is also a normative 
power: by exercising the right, I put you under a duty to answer me.13 Stand-
ing is thus the mirror image of interpersonal responsibility: I have standing to 
call you to account for a given act if and only if you are responsible to me for 
that act, that is, you are duty-bound to answer my demand for an accounting. 
Standing is a kind of positional moral entitlement in that it depends on how 
and where a blamer stands in relation to the target of moral criticism. We are 
said to lack standing to criticize others for their wrongdoing when we are too 
far removed from it (their wrongdoing is none of our business), when we are 
too close to it (we are complicit), and when we are in a moral position similar 
or identical to that of the wrongdoer (our blame is hypocritical).14 These cir-
cumstances undermine our entitlement to criticize not by establishing that the 
targets of our criticism are in fact blameless, but by establishing that we our-
selves are in a bad position to criticize them. If we criticize them anyway, we 
will ordinarily fail to put them under a duty to answer us. Wrongdoers gener-
ally are not morally obligated to answer to us (they are not responsible to us) if 
we are complicit in their wrongdoing, if we criticize them hypocritically, or if 
our criticism is meddlesome or officious, targeting wrongdoing that is none of 
our business or is less properly our business than the business of another. 
Wrongdoers whom we criticize without standing are thus entitled to deflect 
our criticism even if it is sound. 
Wrongdoers whom we criticize without standing also may be entitled to 
criticize us in return. If you owe me no answer for your supposed wrongdoing, 
 
12. On the nature of moral standing in general, see James Edwards, Standing to Hold Responsible, 
16 J. MORAL PHIL. 437, 437-40 (2019); and Ori J. Herstein, Understanding Standing: Permis-
sion to Deflect Reasons, 174 PHIL. STUD. 3109, 3110-11 (2017). 
13. We should distinguish (i) the responsive duties that spring from my calling you to account 
from (ii) the ameliorative duties that spring directly from your wronging me (duties to apol-
ogize, repair, compensate). The ameliorative duties arise regardless of whether I have called 
you to account, provided you actually wronged me. The responsive duties arise regardless of 
whether you actually wronged me, provided I called you to account on reasonable grounds 
and had standing to do so. 
14. For a general discussion of how meddling, complicity, and hypocrisy can undermine a per-
son’s standing to blame, see D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, The Nature and Ethics of 
Blame, 7 PHIL. COMPASS 197, 203-4 (2012). 
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then, all else equal, I will wrong you if I demand one.15 What’s more, if the 
particular reason why I lack standing is that my intervention is meddlesome—if 
your wrongdoing is not properly my concern or is more properly the concern 
of another—then my intervention will also wrong your victim, whose preroga-
tive to call you to account is supplanted by my meddlesome intervention. Alt-
hough meddlesomeness is o�en a personal vice16 (a moral blemish on the 
blamer), if it were only a personal vice, meddlesome blame might be morally 
undesirable, but it would not be a wrong to the person we blame or to that per-
son’s victim. Undesirable or vicious actions do not necessarily wrong the people 
they affect. If I refuse to donate to your museum because I am stingy and 
selfish, then I exhibit vice (and do something I shouldn’t do) but I do not 
thereby wrong you or your museum. I do not wrong you because you have no 
relevant claim on me—no claim to a charitable donation, and no claim that I 
exhibit the virtue of generosity. By contrast, you do have a claim that I not 
blame you for something that is none of my business. So does your victim, who 
may justly complain about my meddlesome interference.17 Standing is thus a 
protected entitlement: your victim’s standing to call you to account is not only a 
 
15. See Herstein, supra note 12, at 3113 (“[I]ntervening under conditions of meddling, lack of 
status or hypocrisy involves some sort of wronging against the intervention’s target. We can 
detect this wrongness in the critical reactions of addressees to those who, for example, direct 
them hypocritically or officiously. For instance, ‘who the hell are you to demand that of me!’; 
‘you stay out of it!’; or ‘mind your own business!’ are responses we tend to bark rather than 
say. And we view such reactions as appropriate, even though they involve negative, aggres-
sive and even hurtful emotions and behavior, such as annoyance, criticism, indignation and 
anger. Most importantly, we ground the justification for such reactions in the intervener’s 
meddling, hypocrisy or lack of status.”); Linda Radzik, On Minding Your Own Business: 
Differentiating Accountability Relations Within the Moral Community, 37 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 
574, 575 (2011) (“[People] believe it is wrong to sanction people when it is not one’s place to 
do so. A failure to mind one’s own business is something for which one can be held account-
able.”). 
16. On the vice of nosiness, see Linda Radzik, On the Virtue of Minding Our Own Business, 46 J. 
VALUE INQUIRY 173, 173-74 (2012). On the vice of “judgmentalism,” see Caroline J. Simon, 
Judgmentalism, 6 FAITH & PHIL. 275, 275 (1989). 
17. Similar considerations show that the norm against meddling is not simply a norm of epis-
temic rationality by another name. Although blaming someone without sufficient evidence 
can be morally inappropriate, doing so does not necessarily wrong the person blamed. If you 
are in fact blameworthy and your wrongdoing is my business, I do not wrong you when I 
blame you on a hunch. In any event, if meddlesome blame were objectionable primarily be-
cause it tends to lack a sufficient evidentiary basis—if the norm against meddling were at 
bottom a norm against intervening in affairs about which we lack evidence—the norm 
would do two things it does not in fact do: bar us from scrutinizing faults in an intimate 
who has successfully concealed them, and permit us to criticize a stranger for a private fault 
that she has accidentally exposed to public view. See Garrath Williams, Sharing Responsibility 
and Holding Responsible, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. 351, 354-55 (2013). 
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right to accuse you and a power to put you under a duty to respond; it is also a 
defeasible right to bar others without standing (or with lesser standing) from 
frustrating your exercise of the former right or power. 
Complicity, hypocrisy, and meddlesomeness are the most commonly dis-
cussed reasons why a blamer’s standing might founder. But there are at least a 
few others. I may lack standing to criticize your conduct if I told you before-
hand that it wasn’t wrongful or that I wouldn’t blame you for it. I may also lack 
standing if my criticism is inconsistent or unfair—if I criticize you for a fault I 
overlook in others, for example, or if I criticize you more strongly for that fault 
than I criticize others who exhibit the same fault to the same degree. My stand-
ing will be particularly in doubt if the reason for my inconsistency is that I am 
invidiously discriminating—if I am criticizing you for a fault I find objectiona-
ble only in people belonging to certain groups, or for a fault I find more objec-
tionable in people belonging to those groups than in others. Similar circum-
stances can undermine a lawsuit.18 A judge will dismiss a criminal charge if the 
prosecutor’s charging decision was invidiously discriminatory19 or if the gov-
ernment previously assured the defendant that the conduct in question was 
lawful.20 A jury will acquit the defendant if it finds that the government has 
“hypocritically” sought to call her to account for a crime she committed only 
because of police “complicity” that rose to the level of entrapment. Comparable 
legal defenses apply in the civil arena, where plaintiffs guilty of hypocrisy or 
complicity lie vulnerable to the doctrines of equitable estoppel21 and “clean 
hands.”22 Even a virtuous plaintiff will come up short, will fall below the “irre-
 
18. Like other writers, I find it illuminating to draw an analogy between the circumstances that 
undermine a person’s presumptive moral entitlement to call another to account and the cir-
cumstances that ground several legal defenses. The argument that follows does not depend 
on the soundness of this analogy. Nor does it depend on the aptness of the term “standing” 
as a label for the presumptive moral entitlement or on there being any deeper unity among 
the circumstances that can undermine it. 
19. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996). 
20. Many jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code in granting a defense to people who rea-
sonably rely on certain official misstatements of the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Criminal Law: 
Official Statement Mistake of Law Defense, 89 A.L.R.4th 1026 (1991) (collecting cases). 
21. The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars your denying a proposition that you previously in-
duced someone else to rely on when such denial would work to the other person’s disad-
vantage. Koval v. Koval, 576 So. 2d 134, 137 (Miss. 1991). 
22. The doctrine of “clean hands” bars you from obtaining an equitable remedy (such as a court 
order commanding someone to vacate your land or to perform the specific acts described in 
a contract) when you are “guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue.” Bailey v. 
Bailey, 97-CA-00577-SCT (¶ 6), 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (Miss. 1998) (citing Calcote v. Calcote, 
583 So.2d 197, 199-200 (Miss. 1991)). 
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ducible constitutional minimum of standing,” if the plaintiff has not suffered 
an “injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant,”23 the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing thus being in effect none of 
the plaintiff ’s business. 
The last of these doctrines, which lawyers know as Article III standing, is 
evidently what brought the term “standing” into common usage. Article III 
standing emerged as a discrete legal requirement in the early twentieth century 
as progressive judges, intent on protecting agency decisionmaking from judi-
cial interference, sought to block lawsuits filed by plaintiffs hostile to adminis-
trative regulation.24 Since then, the doctrine of Article III standing has figured 
far more prominently in public law than in private law. In private law, the ques-
tion of standing rarely serves as a locus of dispute. That is not because the con-
cept of standing is unimportant to private claims. It is instead because a stand-
ing requirement inheres in the very structure of all private causes of action and 
is therefore satisfied whenever the elements of a cause of action are.25 From 
negligence, to trespass, to breach of contract, private causes of action all require 
that the plaintiff have suffered an injury or violation of legal rights as a result of 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct—wrongful conduct that, by dint of such in-
jury or violation, is appropriately the plaintiff ’s business. 
Despite the legal origin of the term, the concept of standing is as much mor-
al as legal, which is why we can deploy the concept not only from within our 
legal practices (using the doctrines and defenses I described a moment ago), 
but also when evaluating those practices from the outside. When legal theorists 
deploy the concept of standing from an external vantage, they tend to inquire 
about the legitimacy of our legal practices under conditions of injustice, asking 
whether the state lacks moral standing to condemn someone whose criminality 
 
23. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 
737, 751 (1984); and then quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 
(1976)). The concept of “injury in fact” is open-ended and partly a function of legislative 
whim. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“Congress has the power to de-
fine injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580)). 
24. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1437 
(1988). 
25. See id. at 1434-35 (“[In] private law, . . . the issues of standing, cause of action, and the merits 
are closely intertwined. . . . For all three issues, the question is whether A has violated a duty 
it owes to B. C, an affected third party, generally may not bring suit when A injures B—even 
if C is materially affected. At private law, there is no need for a distinctive set of principles to 
govern standing.” (footnote omitted)); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (interpreting tort law as presuppos-
ing a rule of “substantive standing” according to which “[a] plaintiff cannot win unless the 
defendant’s conduct was a wrong relative to her, [that is], unless her right was violated”). 
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flows from injustices that the state has created or willfully failed to amelio-
rate.26 This question is important and urgent. But it is not the question I pose 
in this Essay. My question is more basic: What could give even a perfectly just 
state the exclusive moral standing to hold people criminally accountable for 
their interpersonal wrongs? How could these wrongs be the business of the 
polity and the polity alone, rather than (also) the business of their direct vic-
tims? 
In morality, a capable and uncompromised human victim typically gets 
both the first word and the last, enjoying moral standing of a caliber exceeding 
that of most if not all third parties. Victims generally have standing to express 
the harshest criticism, demand answers with the greatest urgency, and impose 
sanctions of the greatest severity—everything from a cold shoulder or a hot re-
buke to a public shaming or an excommunication. What’s more, how victims 
choose to exercise their powers to blame and forgive tends to determine how 
third parties should exercise their own powers. When a victim forgives, third 
parties generally should mute their blame; when a victim blames, third parties 
generally should withhold their forgiveness. The structures of accountability 
we find in ordinary life thus exhibit principles of differential standing: most 
third parties lack standing of any kind, a few possess standing of varying de-
grees of robustness, and the victim stands at the apex. In our criminal legal sys-
tem, by contrast, a single third party stands alone. The state takes total charge 
of the moral transaction with perpetrators of interpersonal wrongs, denying 
effective legal standing to all other parties, including the victim. The state 
claims the prerogative to hold a wrongdoer criminally accountable regardless of 
whether the victim has chosen to condemn the wrong or to forgive it. When 
the state goes forward with a prosecution, it holds the wrongdoer accountable 
with a robustness that, in ordinary life, is the prerogative only of victims and 
their close associates. Criminal prosecution expresses the harshest moral criti-
cism, demands answers with the greatest urgency, and imposes sanctions of the 
greatest severity. Judged by conventional moral principles of differential stand-
ing, the practice of exclusive public prosecution comes off as a kind of med-
dling—not because interpersonal wrongdoing is altogether no business of the 
polity, but because it seems most properly the business of the victim. In a nut-
shell, that is the problem of criminal standing. 
 
26. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 388 n.4 
(1976) (“If . . . society itself were responsible for any deprivations or degradations that the 
actor had suffered, society might not be entitled to condemn that actor.”). See generally Gary 
Watson, A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law, 58 INQUIRY 168 (2015) (considering 
whether the state lacks standing to punish offenders who are “victims of severe social injus-
tice”).  
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The problem may fade from view if we attend with blinkered eyes to the in-
juries that interpersonal criminal wrongs inflict on the broader community. 
Venerable conceptions of crime deem the communal injury paramount. John 
Locke called every crime “a trespass against the whole species.”27 About a cen-
tury later, William Blackstone classified crimes as “public wrongs,”28 where 
conduct constitutes a public wrong (as opposed to a “private . . . or civil in-
jur[y]”) if it is a “breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to 
the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate ca-
pacity. . . . [T]reason, murder, and robbery are properly ranked among crimes; 
since, besides the injury done to individuals, they strike at the very being of so-
ciety.”29 In a similar spirit but a more contemporary idiom, Lawrence C. Becker 
argues that conduct is properly criminalized if it causes “social volatility”30; 
Robert Nozick, if it arouses general fear.31 These ideas encourage us to conceive 
criminal wrongs as wrongs to the public, wrongs that are criminal because and 
to the extent the public is their victim. If crime’s essential feature is that it 
wrongs the polity, then the problem of criminal standing is no problem at all. 
We may readily agree with Douglas N. Husak that “[the polity’s] authority to 
punish [crime] is no more mysterious than the authority of any person or insti-
tution to deliberately impose a stigmatizing deprivation on those who commit 
wrongs against it.”32 
The difficulty is that our criminal legal system does not punish all crimes as 
wrongs against the polity. Our system properly treats rape and murder and 
other traditional interpersonal crimes not (merely) as wrongs against the polity 
but also, primarily, as wrongs against their individual human victims. Conceiv-
ing of all crimes as wrongs against the polity thus resolves the problem of crim-
inal standing at a prohibitive cost, a cost that Duff and S.E. Marshall explain in 
terms of a “distort[ion] [of] the criminally wrongful character”33 of traditional 
interpersonal crimes. “What makes rape and murder criminal,” Duff and Mar-
 
27. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 264, 
272 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.  
29. Id. 
30. Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempts and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 262, 274 (1974). 
31. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 65-71 (1974). 
32. Douglas N. Husak, Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?, in THE NEW PHILOSO-
PHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 97, 104 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016). 
33. R.A. Duff & S.E. Marshall, Public and Private Wrongs, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL LAW IN HON-
OUR OF SIR GERALD GORDON 70, 71 (James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & Lindsay Farmer 
eds., 2010). 
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shall explain, “is not that the murderer or rapist harms or wrongs the public at 
large, but [rather] what he does to his individual victim.”34 When the polity qua 
prosecutor calls murderers and rapists to account, it calls them to account not 
as their victim but as a third party. Our criminal legal system thus runs head-
long into the problem of criminal standing, the question why exclusive stand-
ing to hold interpersonal criminal wrongdoers accountable belongs to a third 
party like the state. 
We cannot answer this question just by listing the many evident advantages 
of a system of exclusive public prosecution. The problem of criminal standing 
simply is not a problem of justification. We will explore the difference between 
standing and justification more fully in Part IV. For now, it is enough to note 
the intuitive difference between judging that given wrongdoing is our business 
and judging that we are justified, all things considered, in calling the wrongdo-
er to account. If my calling you to account would be hurtful, gratuitous, coun-
terproductive, mean-spirited, demeaning, uncharitable, self-aggrandizing, or 
petty, then, in the circumstances, I am unjustified in criticizing you even if your 
wrong is squarely my business.35 Conversely, if by calling you to account I can 
produce a very good result or prevent a very bad one, then I might be justified 
in calling you to account for a wrong that is not properly my business or is 
more properly the business of another. What is true of interpersonal blame and 
condemnation seems equally true of their institutional analogs—prosecution 
and punishment. Even if the state has standing to prosecute and punish you for 
a given crime, it might not be justified in doing so: prosecuting you might cost 
too much, do too little good, or intrude too much on important personal inter-
ests, such as the interests you and your victim share in achieving reconciliation 
without the interference of a depersonalizing bureaucracy. Conversely, if the 
state lacks standing to call you to account—if it is presumptively disentitled to 
do so because it was an accomplice to your wrong or because your wrong is 
more properly the business of its direct victim than of the polity—the state 
might be justified in prosecuting you anyway if by doing so it can produce sub-
stantial good or prevent substantial harm. 
Whether the state has exclusive standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers 
to account is therefore a separate question from whether exclusive public pros-
 
34. Id. (emphasis added). 
35. See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Shared Intention and Personal Intentions, 144 PHIL. STUD. 167, 177 
(2009) (“[W]ere [someone] so sensitive to criticism that she would suffer a grave physical 
crisis if rebuked, in most circumstances it would be wrong to rebuke her even if one had the 
standing to do so.”); Williams, supra note 17, at 353 (“All sorts of considerations—especially 
in a personal relationship—might mean that it would be callous, overbearing or otherwise 
inappropriate to exercise my standing to rebuke.”). 
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ecution is justified. Still, we cannot answer these separate questions separately. 
We cannot answer them separately because we cannot justify the practice of ex-
clusive public prosecution unless we account for all of its moral shortcomings, 
chief among them the possibility that a state that engages in exclusive public 
prosecution exceeds its moral standing by supplanting the prerogative of the 
victim. 
i i .  the relational model of the criminal process 
The practice of exclusive public prosecution calls the state’s moral standing 
into question only in a legal system that exemplifies the relational model of the 
criminal process, a legal system that treats prosecution as a means of calling 
offenders to account for their moral wrongs. A legal system does not exemplify 
the relational model just because it criminalizes conduct that is morally wrong-
ful, or just because it imposes punishment that is proportionate to the miscon-
duct’s seriousness, or even because the punishment the system imposes inflicts 
the amount of suffering deserved (assuming any suffering is ever deserved). A 
system that imposes proportionate and deserved punishment for morally 
wrongful conduct might do so through a means that is detached and clinical, 
that subjects offenders to moral evaluation but passes judgment on them from 
a height. A system that imposes retributive punishment a�er passing judgment 
from a clinical height does not exemplify the relational model—and therefore 
does not confront the problem of criminal standing—because it does not draw 
defendants into a moral transaction of accusation and answer. Our system does 
draw defendants into such a transaction, though, and this Part explains how.  
The relational character of the Anglo-American system manifests itself both 
in the law of liability and in the structure of the trial. The law of liability is 
above all the law of what constitutes a crime. In our system, an accusation that 
the defendant has committed a crime is neither a neutral description of what 
the defendant has allegedly done nor a detached reference to the legal norm 
that the defendant has allegedly violated. It is a charge—a demand that pur-
ports to burden the defendant with a duty to respond.36 Defendants must meet 
that demand as they would meet a moral one: either by accepting responsibil-
ity—by pleading guilty and submitting to a criminal sentence, the formal ana-
logues of apologizing and making amends—or by denying responsibility and 
contesting some aspect of the accusation.37 
 
36. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 116. 
37. Id.; 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 154. 
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Besides defining crimes, the law of liability identifies various grounds on 
which defendants may contest a criminal charge. Many of them parallel the 
ways people may disclaim moral responsibility for an allegedly wrongful act.38 
Moral defenses of practically every sort conjure a legal analog. When accused of 
moral wrongdoing, I may deny that I performed the act (alibi, mistaken identi-
ty); I may admit that I performed the act but deny that acts of the relevant type 
are wrongful (“undisclosed self-dealing doesn’t constitute wire fraud”); or I 
may acknowledge that acts of the relevant type are wrongful but insist that my 
particular act was justified (self-defense, defense of others, necessity). If I can-
not justify the act, I may deny that I was to blame for it, maintaining that I was 
excused (duress, mistake of fact), temporarily not in my right mind (intoxica-
tion, automatism, somnambulism), or altogether unfit to be blamed for any-
thing (insanity, infancy). If I cannot credibly deny that I was to blame for my 
concededly wrongful act, I may turn the accusation against my accusers and 
deny that they have any right to call me to account. Perhaps they told me the 
act wasn’t wrongful (official misstatement of law); they enticed me to perform 
the act (entrapment); they’re making an accusation about the distant past 
(statute of limitations); they’re accusing me of bad conduct only because of the 
group I belong to (selective prosecution); or the conduct for which they’re crit-
icizing me is not properly their business (“I performed the conduct in another 
jurisdiction”; “The conduct is constitutionally protected”). 
When criminal defendants mount the parenthetically noted legal analogs of 
these moral defenses, they mount them in (or in anticipation of) a criminal tri-
al that Anglo-American law structures as a reciprocal moral encounter, rather 
than as a morally neutral inquiry designed to “discover the facts about the de-
fendant’s past conduct and present condition which are relevant to determining 
her future disposal.”39 An inquiry with the sole aim of finding the truth would 
not grant defendants an ironclad right to appear in person, to testify if and only 
if they wish, to confront and cross-examine their accusers in open court, or to 
be tried only when “mentally competent” (i.e., able to understand the proceed-
ings against them and to assist in their defense). An inquiry with the sole aim 
of finding the truth would address such matters on a case-by-case basis, guided 
 
38. 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 154-56; see also R.A. Duff, “I Might Be Guilty, but You 
Can’t Try Me”: Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 245, 246-47 (2003) (de-
scribing criminal “defenses” and “bars to trial”). But see Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as 
Public Law, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 21, 23 (R.A. Duff & Stu-
art P. Green eds., 2011) (“[C]riminal wrongs and justifications in the common law world do 
not even approximately follow the contours of moral wrongdoing and justification.”). 
39. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 34-35, 129; 2 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDG-
MENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 1, 3 (Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Vic-
tor Tadros eds., 2006). 
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only by a concern for whether permitting or requiring the defendant’s intelli-
gent participation in the trial would make an accurate verdict more likely. An-
glo-American law does not take a case-by-case approach to any of these mat-
ters. It treats the defendant’s intelligent and autonomous participation as an 
indispensable component of the trial. A trial may not proceed against a mental-
ly incompetent defendant under any circumstances,40 and it may proceed with-
out the defendant’s presence or without the defendant’s active and voluntary 
participation only when the defendant has waived or forfeited the relevant 
rights.41 These features of the criminal process flow naturally and ineluctably 
from a conception of the trial as a site of moral reckoning,42 in which the accus-
er communicates blame to and demands an answer from an alleged wrongdoer, 
drawing the accused into a moral relationship rather than passing judgment on 
the accused from a clinical distance. 
To be sure, the participatory and communicative features of the Anglo-
American trial draw ample additional support from values that are nonrelation-
al.43 For example, permitting defendants to testify and confront their accusers 
o�en serves the nonrelational value of accuracy: suspected wrongdoers have 
 
40. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person 
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and ob-
ject of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his 
defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). 
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (explaining when defendants must be present during a federal 
criminal proceeding); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (de-
scribing the defendant’s right to testify at trial). 
42. See DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 117 (“The point [of the right to be heard 
at trial] is not simply that a court which refuses to hear the defendant may reach an inaccu-
rate verdict, but that it is refusing to recognize his status as a participant in the trial; it com-
mits the same kind of injustice as one who criticises another for an alleged moral offence but 
refuses to listen to his response to that criticism.”); DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra 
note 3, at 34 (“[S]omeone who is called to answer to a charge of wrongdoing must be capa-
ble of answering to it, or else her trial becomes a travesty. It also matters that the defendant 
be present, and answer to the charge: we should not force her to answer, since she should 
retain the freedom to express her dissent from the process, by refusing to play any active 
part in it; but the trial seeks her participation.” (footnotes omitted)); 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, 
supra note 3, at 118 (“[I]f we think it important that . . . the accused should have to answer 
in person . . . to the charge that he faces; and if . . . this is because what he is charged with is 
a wrong for which he must answer to the polity as a whole . . . [then] it must also be im-
portant that other members of the polity with a role in the trial—as witnesses, as judges or 
as jurors—should face him in person. There would be a clear contradiction in calling on you 
to answer in person to us, but refusing to face you ourselves.”). 
43. See 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 99-100 (discussing and criticizing nonrelational 
rationales for a defendant’s right to testify, decline to testify, mount a defense, and be tried 
only if mentally fit). 
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strong incentives to subject the charges against them to vigorous factual scruti-
ny,44 and they may have unique access to information about the circumstances 
surrounding their alleged wrongdoing even if they were not themselves the 
perpetrators. Permitting defendants to testify and confront their accusers also 
serves the nonrelational values of fairness and dignity. These values favor de-
fendant participation not as aids to the truth-seeking process but as independ-
ent moral constraints on it. “[T]here is intrinsic value in the due process right 
to be heard,” asserts Laurence H. Tribe, “since it grants to the individuals or 
groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate 
in the processes by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that ex-
presses their dignity as persons.”45 Proper respect for personal dignity therefore 
might require that all high-stakes adjudicative procedures (not just criminal 
trials) be participatory and communicative, regardless of whether these rela-
tional elements promote truth-seeking, and even if they sometimes frustrate it. 
As Tribe suggests, “Both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told 
why . . . express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is 
at least to be consulted about what is done with one.”46 
Not only does Anglo-American procedural law draw support from nonrela-
tional values like fairness, dignity, and accuracy, but the Anglo-American crim-
inal legal system as a whole pursues nonrelational ends like deterrence and in-
capacitation. These things do not make the system itself nonrelational; nor do 
they obviate the problem of criminal standing. Even if a criminal legal system 
pursues only nonrelational ends and its procedural law aspires to uphold only 
nonrelational values, the system is a relational one as long as criminal prosecu-
tion takes the form of a moral transaction in which one party communicates 
blame to and demands answers from another. If criminal prosecution takes this 
form—if it accuses defendants of moral wrongdoing and demands that they 
answer for it—then the system confronts the problem of criminal standing. 
The system cannot evade the question of standing by adverting to its deterrent 
and incapacitative ends, any more than I can deflect the question whether I 
have standing to criticize you by asserting that my sole purpose is to influence 
 
44. Cf. id. at 99 (“[I]t might be suggested that the defendant's right to defend himself is re-
quired because the evidence provided by the prosecution can only be thought convincing if 
it can withstand the scrutiny of the defence.”). 
45. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (1978).  
46. Id. at 503. Responding to Tribe, Duff distinguishes a participatory right grounded in dignity 
from one grounded in mutual accountability: “[A] defendant’s right to be heard at her trial 
is more than the right to have a say in a decision which will have a serious impact on her: it 
is the right to respond to charges which are laid against her; and this right is internal to the 
idea of a criminal trial as a process which calls a defendant to answer for her actions.” DUFF, 
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, supra note 3, at 118. 
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your future behavior. No matter which ends people and collective agents pur-
sue, they will confront the question of standing if they pursue their ends by 
calling others to account. The question of standing does not cease to apply just 
because the entity calling another to account has an ulterior motive. 
i i i .  criminal law as moral inversion 
In our criminal legal system, the entity calling another to account is always 
the state. It is the state’s role, not the victim’s, to demand an answer from al-
leged wrongdoers, and it is to the state, not the victim, that alleged wrongdoers 
must tender their answer. The state might implore the victim to participate as a 
witness, and the victim’s willingness to go along might affect the ultimate deci-
sion whether to proceed with a prosecution, but the decision is always the 
state’s. The state’s prerogative to serve as moral accuser is all but inalienable in 
the criminal arena,47 and the state’s potency as a litigant surpasses that of any 
private plaintiff. It is true that victims of blameworthy tortious wrongdoing 
sometimes can obtain punitive damages—extra-compensatory damages award-
ed in order to punish and deter wrongdoing that is “intentional and deliberate” 
and displays “the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.”48 But 
an award of punitive damages stings far less than a prison sentence, and, like 
all tort remedies, it is available only to victims who have suffered some kind of 
injury. While punitive damages are available to victims of paradigmatic torts 
like assault, battery, and conversion, civil damages of all kinds are off limits to 
victims of deadly serious wrongdoing that causes no injury, such as many cases 
of attempted murder. With respect to serious interpersonal wrongdoing, the 
law overall subordinates human victims to the state, granting the state the right 
to sanction a broader category of interpersonal wrongs and to sanction them 
more severely. The resulting legal arrangement inverts the hierarchy between 
victims and third parties that characterizes ordinary life—a moral inversion that 
this Part displays by delineating the victim-centered conception of differential 
standing embedded in commonsense morality. 
 
47. American jurisdictions all but completely prohibit private prosecutions. See generally Darryl 
K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103 
MINN. L. REV. 843, 867-73 (2018) (recounting the history of private prosecution in United 
States jurisdictions). Certain other Western countries permit private prosecution for minor 
offenses. See, e.g., DUFF, REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing France and 
Germany). 
48. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (student ed.). 
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In ordinary life, the victim of a given wrong typically possesses a caliber of 
moral standing more robust than that of any third party. The robustness of a 
person’s standing vis-à-vis some wrong is a matter of what the person has 
standing to do when calling the wrongdoer to account. Relative to a third par-
ty, the victim typically has standing to express harsher moral criticism, demand 
answers with greater urgency (i.e., make demands that generate more stringent 
responsive duties), and impose interpersonal sanctions of greater severity. Vic-
tims also have standing to accept apologies and offer forgiveness, a kind of 
standing that third parties possess in diminished form or lack altogether.49 
Most third parties lack the right to do anything but form critical moral judg-
ments and experience feelings of blame and indignation. Although many third 
parties may be quick to form a moral judgment, most are rightly slow to ex-
press it to a wrongdoer’s face, especially when the wrongdoer and victim are 
strangers to the third party. “[W]hen [a] wrongdoer stands directly before 
us[,] . . . we are . . . rather circumspect about expressing indignation,” observes 
Linda Radzik.50 “[W]hen our indignation is boiling at the incompetent parent 
who spanks her child in the grocery store, we really want to sanction but are 
uncertain whether it is permissible . . . . [W]hat is lacking is o�en not courage 
but confidence in [our] entitlement to sanction.”51 
All else equal, confidence in our entitlement to intervene as a third party is 
weakest when the wrongdoer and victim are strangers to us. It is greater when 
we are acquainted with one or both of the parties, and greatest when one or the 
other is a close associate. Third parties with a relatively close connection to the 
wrongdoer or victim may possess standing not just to criticize the wrongdoer 
but to demand an answer—a denial, justification, excuse, apology, or the like. 
The demand for an answer will saddle a wrongdoer with a responsive duty of 
greater or lesser stringency depending not only on the gravity of the wrong but 
also on the relative distance of the party issuing the demand. Wrongdoers owe 
 
49. Theorists disagree about whether a third party ever has standing to forgive the wrong done 
to the victim, as opposed to the more or less attenuated wrong done to the third party as a 
consequence of the wrong done to the victim (e.g., the distress you caused me when you in-
jured my friend). For a range of views on the possibility and propriety of third-party for-
giveness, see MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELA-
TIONS AFTER WRONGDOING 178-79 (2006); Rosalind Chaplin, Taking It Personally: Third-
Party Forgiveness, Close Relationships, and the Standing to Forgive, in 9 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
NORMATIVE ETHICS 73, 81 (Mark Timmons ed., 2019); Alice MacLachlan, In Defense of 
Third-Party Forgiveness, in THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FORGIVENESS 135, 150-51 (Kathryn J. 
Norlock ed., 2017); and Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY 
& JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 21 (1988). 
50. Radzik, supra note 15, at 583. 
51. Id. 
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more stringent responsive duties to their close associates and to the close asso-
ciates of their victims than to others. Wrongdoers owe the strongest responsive 
duties to their direct victims. Failing to explain yourself to the person you have 
wronged is a more serious moral breach than failing to explain yourself to a 
third party. 
A victim’s standing is not only more robust than that of a typical third par-
ty; it is also, and not coincidentally, less contingent. A victim’s standing to hold 
a wrongdoer accountable is contingent on little beside the victim’s prior con-
duct, specifically, on whether the victim is a hypocrite, was an accomplice to the 
wrong being criticized, promised not to criticize it, and so forth. By contrast, a 
third party’s standing—or, more exactly, the robustness of a third party’s stand-
ing—is contingent not only on the third party’s prior conduct but also on myri-
ad other considerations. As we just saw, one of them is the closeness of the 
third party’s connection with the victim or wrongdoer. The remaining consid-
erations are diverse, and they interact in ways that elude neat systematization. 
The question whether a third party’s intervention constitutes a form of med-
dling is difficult not only for theorists but also for potential third-party 
blamers. As Radzik notes, when seeking to ascertain whether a stranger’s 
wrongdoing “counts as our business,” such that we have standing to call the 
wrongdoer to account, “[w]e puzzle over the severity of the wrong, the setting 
of the wrong, the intimacy of our relations to victim and wrongdoer, whether 
other bystanders are more intimately related to the main parties, how motivat-
ed these others are to do the work of sanctioning, [and] how effective their 
sanctions are.”52 Rarely does any such consideration operate categorically. For 
the most part, each is only a factor, a consideration tending to push a given 
wrong closer to or further away from the domain over which we have jurisdic-
tion as third-party blamers. 
One factor of uncertain significance is a wrong’s severity. Although we 
might not hesitate to call Hitler or bin Laden to account for their atrocities, 
many of us might feel out of place taking a complete stranger to task for a 
string of armed robberies, serious though that sort of violent wrongdoing is. 
Hitler and bin Laden are moral extremes. The exceptional gravity of their 
wrongs seems to grant all moral beings standing to hold them accountable, ir-
respective of other factors. As regards most other wrongs, even many very seri-
ous ones, a wrong’s severity alone usually seems insufficient to make it our 
business to criticize the wrongdoer to their face. When the wrongdoer and vic-
tim are both strangers to us, the wrong’s sheer proximity o�en seems a more 
important factor than its severity. We are far likelier to feel entitled to repri-
 
52. Id. at 591. 
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mand a pickpocket we observe in action than to feel entitled to reprimand 
someone who we are told picked a pocket yesterday or last week. A stranger’s 
wrong rarely becomes our business just because it is severe. The obverse seems 
false, however: if we have a close relationship with the wrongdoer or victim, 
that relationship seems to make even minor wrongs our business, granting us 
standing to hold our spouses accountable for being rude to a store clerk or to 
hold a stranger accountable for scratching our parents’ car. 
Another factor bearing on our standing to intervene as a third party is the 
moral or psychological status of the victim. When immaturity, incapacity, or 
subjugation renders a victim unable to hold a wrongdoer accountable, or when 
fear or lack of self-respect renders the victim unwilling, we might feel entitled 
to step in and call the wrongdoer to account for a wrong we otherwise would 
regard as none of our business. Here and elsewhere, it can be difficult to dis-
cern whether our feeling of entitlement stems from a conviction that the wrong 
has become our business, thanks to the victim’s infirmity or timidity, or instead 
from a sense that the circumstances justify our intervention even though the 
wrong is not our business. This distinction will matter in Part IV. At this junc-
ture, it suffices to observe that a third party’s standing is rarely, if ever, more 
robust than that of a capable victim. Nor is a third party’s standing usually 
more robust than that of other capable third parties who are positioned closer 
to the victim or wrongdoer. In ordinary life, a given third party’s standing is 
thus contingent not only on the status of the victim but on the status of other 
third parties. 
When we turn to the criminal law, however, we find a single third party 
with purported moral standing contingent on that of no other party, not even 
the victim. The state is by definition a third party to every interpersonal moral 
wrong, as is the polity that the state represents, yet the state’s purported stand-
ing to call perpetrators of interpersonal criminal wrongdoing to account is 
maximally robust and minimally contingent—the opposite of a third party’s 
standing in ordinary life. There, the principal complaint is the victim’s. In law, 
the principal complaint is the polity’s. The victim can sue in tort, if at all. In or-
dinary life, a victim’s forgiveness or acceptance of an apology can transform a 
moral relationship, not only between the victim and the wrongdoer but also 
between the wrongdoer and third parties. Third parties generally should be 
slow to blame wrongdoers whose victims have forgiven them,53 just as they 
should be slow to forgive wrongdoers whose victims have not.54 In law, by con-
trast, if the victim chooses forgiveness over blame or accepts the wrongdoer’s 
 
53. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 56 (2012). 
54. See Glen Pettigrove, The Standing to Forgive, 92 MONIST 583, 598 (2009). 
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apology, these choices have no formal legal effect on the polity qua accuser. 
They are but evidence for the polity to consider or ignore. 
The problem is not simply that the polity qua accuser claims moral stand-
ing to hold its members accountable for wronging one another. Perhaps any 
community has moral standing to subject its members to a measure of third-
party blame for certain serious interpersonal wrongs. The problem is rather 
that, when the polity holds its members accountable through the criminal law, 
the moral transaction takes on the character of second-party blame, both in its 
harshness and in its primacy. Consider in this connection James Edwards’s ob-
servation that a party’s standing to hold another responsible depends not only 
on (i) whom it is holding responsible and (ii) what it is holding them respon-
sible for, but also on (iii) how it is holding them responsible—in particular, 
how harshly it is censuring and sanctioning them.55 A third party’s standing to 
mount a harsh response is difficult to establish under any circumstances. It is 
especially difficult to establish when parties more directly affected by the 
wrongdoing have ample capacity to mount a response of their own, as most 
crime victims would if afforded proper resources. A third party might have 
standing to mount a harsh response when it acts in support of and in solidarity 
with a willing victim, or when a victim is coerced into silence or unable to 
speak up. In such cases, the third party’s response may properly be in the vic-
tim’s name. Yet, in our criminal legal system, the state does not speak in the 
name of the victim. It speaks in the name of the public. The state calls offend-
ers to account to it for wrongs they have perpetrated on others, and it does so 
harshly and in a manner that altogether displaces those who possess what ap-
pears to be a superior claim—those with true second-party standing. Second-
party accountability (accountability demanded by victims) plays no formal role 
whatever in the law of crimes, and it plays at best a secondary role in law over-
all through the law of torts. The resulting arrangement clashes with conven-
tional principles of differential moral standing, which place victims at the apex. 
What kind of arrangement would a state enact if determined to respect 
principles of differential moral standing to the utmost, without regard to 
whether the resulting legal arrangement was justified overall? A state with this 
 
55. Edwards, supra note 12, at 442; see id. at 444 (“Compare two cases in which students might 
hold one another responsible for failing to prepare for class. In the first, they do so by refus-
ing to share notes with those who fail to prepare, and who offer no satisfactory explanation 
for the failure. In the second they do so by barring those who fail to prepare from the class-
room until a satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. It seems clear that there is something 
defective about the second holding: students, we might plausibly say, do not have standing 
to bar one another from class.”). 
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parochial commitment would enact a system of routine private prosecution,56 
based perhaps on the “civil model” of the criminal process described (but not 
endorsed) by Marshall and Duff: 
A civil model puts the victim in charge. She is the complainant who ini-
tiates the proceedings against the person who (allegedly) wronged her; 
it is for her to carry the case through, or to drop it. This is not to say 
that the community has no role. . . . [I]t provides the institutional 
structure through which her case is decided, and the arbitrator or judge 
who will assist in resolving the case or produce an authoritative deci-
sion, as well as enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the alleged 
wrongdoer complies with the decision; it could also provide advice and 
resources to assist the complainant in pursuing her case. But she is still 
in charge: it is for her to decide whether the case is brought and pur-
sued, and whether the decision is enforced . . . .57 
If a state implemented Marshall and Duff ’s civil model of the criminal process, 
it would cast itself in the role of a supporting player. Its chief function in the 
criminal arena would be to hear and adjudicate claims brought by victims, 
whom it might support by providing pro bono counsel and professional inves-
tigators. The state would serve as lead prosecutor only when the defendant’s 
misconduct did not (or did not merely) wrong individual human victims, but 
instead (or also) wronged the public, the state itself, or no one in particular—a 
miscellaneous category of offenses encompassing environmental crimes, pos-
session offenses, reckless driving, and insider trading.58 Consistent with prin-
ciples of differential standing, the state might serve as co-prosecutor in a case 
of paradigmatically interpersonal wrongdoing where the crime caused indirect 
harm to the larger community59 or constituted an attack on an individual qua 
member of an oppressed group, the equal moral status of which the state might 
help to vindicate by exercising its third-party moral standing.60 As long as the 
state played a secondary role in these cases—seizing full control of the criminal 
process only if the victim (or victim’s proxy) was unavailable, incapable, com-
 
56. Private prosecution was once routine in common-law jurisdictions but now exists only to a 
limited degree in a handful of them and is virtually nonexistent in the United States. See 
Brown, supra note 47, at 867-71. 
57. Marshall & Duff, supra note 4, at 15-16. 
58. For a discussion of similar schemes incorporating a civil model of the criminal process 
alongside a limited role for public prosecution, see Duff & Marshall, supra note 33, at 80-81. 
59. For an account of these injuries, see sources cited supra notes 30-31. 
60. See Stephanos Bibas, Victims Versus the State’s Monopoly on Punishment?, 130 YALE L.J.F. 852, 
862 (2021) (observing that individual acts of sex trafficking harm “women in general”). 
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promised, coerced, or complacent—then the structure of standing in criminal 
law would mirror rather than invert the structure of standing in ordinary life. 
iv.  public prosecution and moral remainder 
Considerations of differential moral standing evidently favor a civil model 
of the criminal process. But other more pressing considerations unquestionably 
oppose it. Suppose we actually entrusted prosecutorial control to crime victims. 
We would see the criminal process deployed far less o�en against offenders 
who prey on the poor, the unsophisticated, the overlenient, the easily intimi-
dated, the readily bought off, the subjugated, the busy, and the distracted, than 
against offenders whose victims are well-resourced, savvy, unforgiving, implac-
able, or incorruptible—not to mention racist, oppressive, or sadistic.61 The cer-
tain prospect of these inequities constitutes an all-but-decisive case against the 
civil model of the criminal process. Yet it does not establish the state’s exclusive 
moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account. Whether the state 
has exclusive moral standing to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account is a 
separate question from whether the state is morally justified overall in enacting 
a system of exclusive public prosecution. If we conflate these questions, we will 
obscure the possibility that the overall balance of reasons favors a system of ex-
clusive public prosecution even as that system intrudes on the moral preroga-
tive of crime victims. And if we obscure this possibility, we will obscure a fur-
ther one, which it is the aim of this Part to defend: that the considerations 
undergirding a victim’s moral prerogative may survive in residual form as rea-
sons to enact a criminal process that grants the victim a significant formal role. 
Let us first acknowledge the obvious: a well-run state is a fairer and more 
effective prosecutor than any crime victim. This fact does not establish the 
state’s exclusive moral standing to serve as criminal accuser, however. For, in 
general, the issue of whether an entity has standing to hold another accounta-
ble is not a matter of whether the entity can do so fairly or effectively, or can do 
so more fairly or more effectively than any other entity can. Imagine a casual 
acquaintance who is oversensitive, volatile, and inarticulate, and, as a result, 
downright bad at holding his spouse accountable for her occasional thoughtless 
remark or selfish decision. Your acquaintance is prone to lash out at his spouse 
without good reason and in ways that are pointless and counterproductive. 
Although you might be certain that you could hold the spouse accountable for 
 
61. For a nigh exhaustive list of the practical and principled considerations weighing against 
granting victims too influential a role in the criminal process, see James Edwards, Criminal 
Law’s Asymmetry, 9 JURIS. 276, 293-95 (2018). 
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her intramarital wrongs far more judiciously and productively than your ac-
quaintance can, that fact hardly makes it your business to intervene. One of 
life’s many ironies is that when you stand at some distance from an intimate re-
lationship, that very distance may enable you to offer measured and effective 
criticism even as it deprives you of the standing to criticize. 
Now, as I acknowledged in Part III, the state’s distance from interpersonal 
wrongdoing does not necessarily deprive the state of the standing to call inter-
personal wrongdoers to account: certain kinds of serious interpersonal wrong-
doing are undoubtedly of proper concern to the community in which they oc-
cur. But just as you cannot derive moral standing to hold your acquaintance’s 
spouse accountable from your ability to do so more judiciously and productive-
ly than your acquaintance can, neither can the state derive exclusive standing to 
hold interpersonal wrongdoers accountable from its ability to do so more fairly, 
effectively, and efficiently than any victim can. The state cannot derive exclusive 
standing even from the fact (if it is one) that a just and livable society simply 
could not exist without a criminal legal system that grants the state exclusive 
legal authority to call interpersonal wrongdoers to account. This fact might 
show that the state is justified in exercising sole legal authority to blame, cen-
sure, and demand answers from criminals for their interpersonal wrongs. But it 
wouldn’t establish that the state has moral standing to do any of these things, 
much less that it has exclusive moral standing to do them.62 For the state might 
be justified in calling given wrongdoers to account even as it lacks (exclusive) 
standing to do so.63 
 
62. Edwards and Simester strike me as justifying public prosecution all things considered, ra-
ther than establishing the state’s exclusive moral standing to call criminals to account, when 
they root the state’s authority to prosecute and punish crime in its superior ability “to get 
answers from . . . wrongdoers.” Edwards & Simester, supra note 4, at 132. Likewise Dempsey, 
who “delineat[es] the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’ in terms of considerations based 
on epistemic privilege, efficiency, and the criminal law’s displacement function [i.e., its pro-
pensity to displace potentially destructive private conflicts].” Dempsey, supra note 4, at 267. 
Whether an entity is good (or best) at calling a wrongdoer to account is one question; 
whether that entity has (exclusive) standing to call the wrongdoer to account is another. 
63. Cf. Kyle G. Fritz, Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State, 13 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 309, 324-25 (2019) (“Many times (though not always) [various] reasons in favor of 
punishing offenders (security, justice for the victims, positive consequences) will be weight-
ier than the state’s lack of standing, and so the state should, all things considered, punish 
them.”). Cristina Roadevin argues that there are “clear case[s] of hypocritical blame where 
that blame is unfair, but it is nevertheless justified by its good consequences, which in turn 
could not be brought about in any other way. Indeed, if it is the case that the only way to 
prevent further wrongdoing is by blaming someone, despite the fact that the blame is unfair, 
then it is morally justified, all things considered.” Cristina Roadevin, Hypocritical Blame, 
Fairness, and Standing, 49 METAPHILOSOPHY 137, 140 (2018). Similar reasoning supports the 
conclusion that even a wrongdoer’s (or alleged wrongdoer’s) lack of blameworthiness does 
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The general possibility of justification without standing is familiar and in-
tuitive. If you admonish some strangers in the park for cruelly mocking their 
clumsy child, a companion might tell you—soundly—“That was none of your 
business, but I’m glad you said something: you did the right thing.”64 You 
might wish to respond that it was your business; someone had to say some-
thing, and no one else would. As you might insist, the reasons for you to inter-
vene were compelling. And you might be right: by hypothesis, you were justi-
fied. But the question is whether you had standing—whether you were 
minding your business or were meddling. One reason why we should not as-
similate the issue of meddling into the broader question of justification is that 
we sometimes might want to say that a person is justified in meddling. Suppose 
that if you did not rebuke the thoughtless spouse for her minor intramarital 
wrongs, something very bad would happen: a neighborhood busybody would 
spread damaging lies or awkward truths about the couple’s marriage, greatly 
embarrassing both of them. Now you very likely would be justified in calling 
the spouse to account for her intramarital wrongs. But it still seems that your 
intervention would be a kind of meddling. If you intervened, you would do so 
with trepidation and regret and might even feel obliged to apologize to both 
parties for butting in. The thoughtless spouse would surely resent your intru-
sion. Your feckless acquaintance probably would resent it too, feeling as though 
you had stepped on his toes. If these feelings are morally appropriate—if you 
really should feel regret and an obligation to apologize, and if your acquaint-
ance and his spouse really are entitled (even if not morally required) to resent 
your intrusion—then your lack of standing seems to have enduring moral con-
sequences, notwithstanding that the circumstances justified your intervention. 
A justified intervener’s apparent lack of standing seems to matter not just to 
how the intervener and those affected should feel but also to how they should 
act. Return to the case of the cruel parents mocking their clumsy child. Even if 
you are justified in intervening, you probably should preface your intervention 
by acknowledging (and perhaps even apologizing for) the fact that the matter 
really is none of your business.65 The parents, for their part, may owe you no 
 
not always render blame unjustified. If you could avert great harm by blaming an innocent 
person, then you might be justified in blaming someone who is blameless. 
64. See G.A. COHEN, FINDING ONESELF IN THE OTHER 120 n.9 (2013) (“[I]t is not . . . my view 
that it is always bad or wrong for someone who is not in a position to condemn to condemn. 
I could agree with a person who said: ‘I really wasn’t in a position to condemn him, but is-
suing that savage condemnation was the only way to rally others and/or to get him to stop, 
and that was more important than making sure that my speech-acts were in accord with my 
“standing.”’”). 
65. Cf. Herstein, supra note 12, at 3113 (“[W]hen intervening under conditions [in which we 
lack standing] we tend to ask for permission, implicitly and even explicitly apologize and 
 
the yale law journal 130:1146  2021 
1174 
answer or explanation. They may owe one instead only to their child. I am be-
ing somewhat tentative about the exact moral consequences of a “standingless” 
intervention because these matters beget controversy and depend on the details 
of a case. It is not much easier to generalize about the consequences of a “stand-
ingless” intervention than to generalize about the factors determining whether 
a person has standing to intervene in the first place. The important point—a 
point we cannot make if we assimilate the issue of meddling into the broader 
question of justification—is that a “standingless” intervention generates moral 
consequences even when the intervention is justified. 
We can think of these consequences as the moral remainder le� by the 
now-breached norm against meddling. Moral remainders arise when the rea-
sons or interests underpinning a breached norm continue to exert moral 
force—continue to bear on how the relevant parties should feel and act.66 A 
familiar example of moral remainder is the duty of repair or compensation. If 
you carelessly break my arm, your action might disable a part of my body, but 
it doesn’t disable or cancel the interests underpinning the norm against injur-
ing me—interests in (at least) dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom 
from pain. These interests were sources of reasons for you before the breach—
they made it the case that you had a duty not to hurt me—and they continue to 
be sources of reasons for you a�erward. It is now impossible for you to act on 
these reasons by not injuring me: you cannot go back in time and comply with 
your duty of noninjury. But you still can show regard for my interests in digni-
ty, autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom from pain. You can feel regret or 
remorse; you can apologize; you can comfort me; you can pay my medical 
bills; you can help me with tasks that I can no longer perform on my own. 
These gestures constitute second-best conformity to the reasons that grounded 
your now-breached duty of noninjury. All else equal, second-best conformity is 
worse than first-best conformity. But second-best conformity is still better than 
full nonconformity, and, in the circumstances I just described, second-best con-
 
o�en even directly admit our wrongdoing. We say things such as ‘I know it’s none of my 
business, but . . .’; ‘I apologize for speaking out of place, yet . . .’; or ‘I will understand if you 
completely ignore what I have to say, however . . .’. These qualifications appear designed to 
preempt criticism and to mitigate or at least acknowledge the wrongness of the interven-
tion.”). 
66. My analysis and explanation of the phenomenon of moral remainder owes much to John 
Gardner’s theory of “primary” and “secondary” obligations and to his “continuity thesis.” See 
John Gardner, What Is Tort Law for? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 
33-44 (2011). 
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formity of one sort or another is morally required.67 Having failed to achieve 
first-best conformity, you may not simply shrug your shoulders and walk away. 
Crucially, second-best conformity to a given norm might be morally re-
quired even when first-best conformity is not. Suppose you rush a sick child to 
the hospital in my car and damage the suspension system when you make a 
fast turn. Your actions are justified. Does that mean you must do no more than 
return my car? No. You should repair the suspension or compensate me for the 
damage. These actions constitute second-best conformity to the reasons under-
lying the norm against damaging my property, reasons rooted in my interest in 
controlling and enjoying what is mine. Although you can no longer conform to 
these reasons perfectly—and although the emergency relieved you of the obli-
gation to act on these reasons when you could conform perfectly—these reasons 
still apply to you now. In residual form, they give you duties of repair and 
compensation. Discharging these duties constitutes second-best conformity to 
the reasons underlying the norm against damaging my property. 
What, then, constitutes second-best conformity to the reasons underlying 
the norm against meddling, and, in particular, the reasons underlying the vic-
tim’s moral prerogative? The answer depends on a host of factors, including the 
nature and gravity of the wrong that we (as meddlers) are condemning, the 
maturity and independence of the victim, the nature and intensity of the inter-
vention, and the reason why we are intervening in an affair that is not our 
business. But it depends most of all on the nature of the interests underlying 
the victim’s moral prerogative, the norm against meddling, and all associated 
principles of differential standing. In approaching this issue, we should avoid 
taking a reductionist view that all but equates the reasons underlying the prin-
ciples of differential standing with the broader set of reasons determining when 
a given act of calling to account is morally justified all things considered. A re-
ductionist view will struggle to accommodate the sense we sometimes have 
that, though a particular act of wrongdoing is properly our concern, we 
shouldn’t criticize it all things considered. A reductionist view also will struggle 
to accommodate the sense we sometimes (if less o�en) have that, though we 
are justified in intervening in a particular person’s affairs, we incur a moral debt 
when we do (a debt evidenced, for example, by an obligation to apologize to 
the affected parties)—just as you incur a moral debt when you damage my car, 
even though justifiably. We can accommodate these moral sentiments more 
easily if we regard the principles of differential standing as resting on a narrow-
 
67. On the imperative of second-best conformity to reasons, see Joseph Raz’s discussion of the 
“conformity principle.” Joseph Raz, Personal Practical Conflicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: 
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 189 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler eds., 2004). 
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er foundation, on a particular set of interests that continue to exert moral force 
even when the overall balance of reasons justifies acting against them. 
I suggest that the most pertinent of these interests, and perhaps also the 
most basic, is the interest we all share in having moral significance as persons. 
Together with associated principles of differential standing, the victim’s moral 
prerogative and the norm against meddling serve our interests in human indi-
viduality and importance by elevating above all others a single individual (the 
victim) along with a small circle of third parties, and granting these individuals 
rights and powers that others either lack outright or possess only in a much 
diminished form. Because we are all potential victims, these principles guaran-
tee that we each stand to acquire a unique set of moral powers vis-à-vis those 
who may wrong us, including not only the power to call our wrongdoers to ac-
count but also the power to demand that third parties refrain from intervening, 
at least until we have had our say. 
Viewed as enabling conditions of human individuality and importance, the 
victim’s moral prerogative and associated norms seem cut from the same cloth 
as other agent-centered norms of partiality and exclusion. Just as the norms of 
differential standing give victims and relevant third parties special rights and 
permissions, so too do familiar norms of self-preference and partiality permit 
and sometimes require us to favor our own good and that of our kith and kin 
over the good of others.68 Like principles of differential standing, these familiar 
norms recognize, honor, and enhance our status as morally significant beings 
with innate tendencies toward affection, loyalty, love, and self-regard. Absent 
norms of self-preference and partiality, we could indulge these human tenden-
cies morally only when, by happenstance, more good would come to the world 
if we cared for ourselves and our close associates than if we didn’t. Permissible 
forms of self-preference and partiality would be hostage to sheer proximity, our 
place in the moral universe as insignificant as our place in the physical one. 
Norms of self-preference and partiality push us back toward the moral center, 
permitting us to assess the morality of an action not only from the point of 
view of the universe69 but also from the point of view of (that is, relative to the 
perspectives, values, and commitments of) persons, conceived as something 
 
68. I take no firm position here on the precise content of these norms, on their comparative 
stringency, or on their ultimate foundations. 
69. The phrase “the point of view of the universe” owes to the nineteenth-century utilitarian 
and radical impartialist Henry Sidgwick, who argued “that each one [of us] is morally 
bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own,” because “the good of 
any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the 
Universe, than the good of any other.” HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 382 (7th 
ed. 1907). 
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more than vectors for the promotion of impartial value. Principles of differen-
tial standing serve a similar function, marking each of us as a transient center 
of the moral universe. Absent these principles, anyone would have standing to 
demand an accounting from anyone else for any act of wrongdoing. As poten-
tial agents of moral riposte, victims and relevant third parties would be situated 
no differently from people on the other side of the world, except in being better 
placed to grab a wrongdoer’s attention. Thanks to principles of differential 
standing, as regards some moral transgression or other, each of us is or will be 
the most important being in existence. 
This potential status is important in its own right. It becomes important in 
a further (but, I suggest, less fundamental) way when others respect our status 
by declining to intervene in affairs that are not properly their concern. When 
those around us abide by norms of differential standing, we enjoy distinctively 
human benefits—benefits that some theorists have deemed the true moral 
foundation of principles of differential standing. These benefits include the 
self-confidence we develop when allowed to experiment and make mistakes 
without fear of public reproach, the dignity we gain as victims of wrongdoing 
when allowed to hold our wrongdoers responsible without interference, and 
the joy and sustenance we derive from interpersonal relationships like friend-
ships and romantic unions, which arguably depend for their very existence on 
it being the case that not everything is everyone’s business.70 Acknowledging 
these benefits should not lead us to regard principles of differential standing as 
valuable only in consequentialist terms, however. These principles enhance our 
lives through their very existence, whether or not people generally adhere to 
them. Merely being in a moral position to hold accountable those who wrong 
us (and to disentitle others who would do so without standing) enhances our 
moral significance as persons, even if circumstances constantly frustrate our 
efforts to exercise exclusive moral standing. Likewise, the norms of self-
preference and partiality are boons to human individuality in their own right, 
even when circumstances prevent us from asserting our interests or from caring 
for our friends and family. The bare permission to harbor special regard for 
 
70. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 458 (“It is precisely because some things are not everyone’s 
business that we can make some things the business of our friends, colleagues, students, and 
teammates in particular, and thereby share our lives with them in ways we do not share 
them with others. . . . It is no overstatement to say that those relationships could not exist—
at least as we know them—were it not possible to open our lives up to particular people, 
while gaining access to theirs . . . . We could not do this if meddlers did not lack standing.”); 
Radzik, supra note 15, at 597 (“[T]hree general considerations that can lead to a restriction of 
the standing to sanction [are] the importance of liberty in self-regarding behavior, the moral 
significance of special interpersonal relationships, and the interests victims have in asserting 
their own authority.”); id. at 593-97. 
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ourselves and those close to us makes us morally significant as persons, rather 
than merely as vectors of value promotion. 
If principles of differential standing are valuable in the first instance as ena-
bling conditions of human individuality and importance, then they are more 
significant to us as victims than as wrongdoers. As victims, we gain normative 
power over all or nearly all other human beings in the universe—power to bur-
den our wrongdoers with a duty to respond to our blame and condemnation, 
and power to deprive all or nearly all others of the privilege to chime in. With 
respect to the wrong in question, we enjoy a presumptive normative status su-
perior to that of everyone else in existence. As wrongdoers, we gain the right to 
deflect criticism levelled by all but a small set of appropriately situated parties. 
This right is undoubtedly important, but it does not place us at the center of 
the moral universe. 
When assessed in consequentialist terms, principles of differential standing 
are again more significant to us as victims than as wrongdoers. Although gen-
eral adherence to these principles enables potential victims and potential 
wrongdoers alike to enjoy exclusive personal relationships, it grants victims 
alone the dignity and sense of importance that flow from holding their wrong-
doers responsible without interference or patronizing assistance—a benefit that 
victims would not receive to any degree were principles of differential standing 
roundly dishonored. General adherence to these principles confers a corre-
sponding but inferior benefit on wrongdoers, in that it minimizes the number 
of people entitled to criticize wrongdoers to their faces and to oblige them to 
provide answers.71 This benefit is inferior not only because wrongdoers are 
vulnerable to criticism whether or not others generally adhere to principles of 
differential standing (adherence merely lessens the potential amount of such 
criticism), but also because the benefit essentially amounts to less hassle. In all, 
if you are a wrongdoer being called to account by a party without standing, you 
have less to complain about than your victim does. 
You may in fact have very little to complain about at all if your wrong is a 
serious interpersonal crime and the party calling you to account is the state. As 
the perpetrator of an interpersonal wrong, you cannot complain that no one 
 
71. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 457 (“Imagine a world in which all our actions were everyone’s 
business. All else being equal, anyone would be able to put us under a duty to justify or ex-
cuse pro tanto wrongs—whatever they may be—and to express remorse and/or repent where 
we cannot do so. Mere strangers would be able to give us these duties simply by holding us 
responsible . . . . It seems clear that in this world, social relations would be far more onerous. 
To interact with strangers would be to take an increased risk of having to expose parts of 
one’s life one would prefer to remain private, both because one would more o�en be duty-
bound to explain oneself to others, and because others would more o�en lack a duty not to 
demand the explanation.”). 
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should have held you responsible. At most, you can complain that you should 
have been held responsible by someone else (your victim). And you cannot 
complain even of this if your serious interpersonal wrong is properly the busi-
ness of the political community, as most or all traditional crimes likely are. (I 
argued in Part III that the state lacks exclusive moral standing to call interper-
sonal wrongdoers to account, not that it lacks any standing whatever.) If you 
fall back on the complaint that you are being called to account by a party with 
subordinate standing, your complaint will come off as petty if not disingenu-
ous—all the more so if (as we are assuming) your wrong was so serious, and 
the surrounding stakes so high, that the state was justified in calling you to ac-
count despite lacking superordinate moral standing. 
The complaint that I can lodge against the polity as your victim is more 
substantial. My complaint is that the state’s intervention, although justified, 
thrust me from my place at the center of the moral universe and deprived me of 
the dignity and sense of importance I would have attained had I been able to 
force you to look me in the eye and explain yourself. Unlike your complaint as 
a wrongdoer, which seems pettier the graver your wrong, my complaint as a 
victim seems the more compelling: the graver your wrong, the more my digni-
ty and sense of importance may suffer when a third party silences or upstages 
me. 
The chief implication is that a system of exclusive public prosecution built 
on the relational model may owe little or nothing to interpersonal wrongdoers 
while owing a considerable amount to their victims, whose superordinate 
standing the state supplants.72 At the end of Part III, I suggested that a crimi-
nal legal system achieves first-best conformity to the norm against meddling if it 
casts the state as a supporting player. As an example of what first-best con-
formity might look like, I described an augmented version of Marshall and 
Duff ’s civil model of the criminal process, in which victims prosecute most cas-
es of interpersonal wrongdoing while the state serves as an occasional coprose-
cutor, seizing full control only when the victim is unavailable, incapable, com-
promised, coerced, or complacent. If first-best conformity to the norm against 
meddling gives victims near-complete control of most criminal prosecutions, 
then second-best conformity might give victims partial control of many. 
The particular arrangement that qualifies as second best depends on several 
factors. The most important is the strength and urgency of the reasons under-
 
72. The state also might owe various procedural concessions when its standing founders be-
cause it has failed to ameliorate criminogenic social conditions. But it will owe these conces-
sions to defendants, not to their victims. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, 
AND COMMUNITY 200 (2001); R.A. Duff, Blame, Moral Standing, and the Legitimacy of the 
Criminal Trial, 23 RATIO 123, 139-40 (2010). 
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lying the principles of differential standing, reasons that the state contravenes 
when it arrogates exclusive authority to hold criminals morally accountable for 
their interpersonal wrongs. I argued a moment ago that these reasons are 
strong and urgent, grounded as they are in agent-centered structures of partial-
ity and exclusion that (i) by their very existence enhance our moral significance 
as persons, rather than as fungible vectors of impartial value, and (ii) confer 
various consequential benefits when people generally adhere to them. If I have 
accorded these reasons more weight than they deserve—if, for example, my 
perception of their importance simply reflects the individualist culture73 that 
has shaped my moral intuitions—then these reasons may leave (far) less of a 
moral remainder when contravened than I have suggested. In that case, the 
problem of criminal standing is easily addressed: we may owe the victim whose 
standing public prosecution supplants no more than an apology and a show of 
regret. The criminal-procedure equivalent of these courtesies might look some-
thing like the suite of modest concessions afforded by American statutes like 
the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which grants victims the right to be in-
formed of hearing dates, to confer with prosecutors, to attend judicial proceed-
ings, and to be “reasonably heard” at proceedings regarding release, plea, sen-
tencing, or parole.74 
If, however, the reasons underlying the principles of differential standing 
are as strong as I have suggested, then the modest courtesies that American law 
affords crime victims do not approach second-best conformity to principles of 
differential standing. A criminal legal system infringing these principles 
through public prosecution owes victims something more. It owes them proce-
dural concessions that would enable them to participate robustly in the process 
of calling their wrongdoers to account, rather than merely looking on or chim-
ing in from the sidelines as the state manages the moral transaction. Such con-
cessions could include any of the following: the right to demand that prosecu-
tors justify their charging decisions; the right to appeal such decisions to the 
 
73. Cross-cultural psychologists o�en distinguish between collectivist and individualist cul-
tures. See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995). Collectivist cul-
tures exhibit “a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as 
parts of one or more collectives (family, coworkers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated 
by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the 
goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness 
to members of these collectives,” whereas individualist cultures exhibit “a social pattern that 
consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives; are 
primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have es-
tablished with others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others; and em-
phasize rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.” Id. 
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2018). 
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court and potentially force or veto a prosecution; the right to appeal a final ver-
dict; the right to compel certain lines of pretrial investigation; the right to testi-
fy at trials; the right to make objections, evidentiary requests, and arguments; 
the right to question witnesses; the right to question defendants and defense 
attorneys; the right to join criminal prosecutions as civil parties seeking dam-
ages or other kinds of nonpenal relief; the right to assist the court in determin-
ing the defendant’s sentence; the right to have their lawyers participate in crim-
inal litigation as auxiliary prosecutors; perhaps even the right to have their 
lawyers serve as fully fledged private prosecutors, subject to the power of the 
public authorities to step in and take over the case where necessary. Many of 
these participatory rights are available in civilian jurisdictions;75 several (in-
cluding limited access to private prosecution) are available in common-law ju-
risdictions as well.76 In the aggregate, these rights and procedures give victims 
a substantial measure of control over the criminal process, going well beyond 
the “non-dispositive” participatory rights available in the American context.77 
Whether the balance of reasons favors granting victims any or all of these 
procedural concessions depends not only on the strength of the residual rea-
sons underlying the principles of differential standing, but also on the strength 
and nature of the reasons that justify the state in transgressing these principles 
in the first place. I alluded to several of these reasons earlier when I glossed the 
serious downside to embracing a civil model of the criminal process—the high 
likelihood that the burdens of prosecution and punishment would fall more 
heavily on criminals whose victims are well-resourced, savvy, unforgiving, or 
implacable, than on those whose victims are poor, unsophisticated, overlenient, 
or easily intimidated. These considerations weigh not only against private 
prosecution in its pure form but also, if to a lesser degree, against any system of 
public prosecution that grants victims significant control. In short, these con-
siderations weigh against doing the very things that constitute second-best 
conformity to principles of differential standing. If what makes first-best con-
formity unachievable is that a system of exclusive private prosecution is unac-
ceptably unfair or ineffective, then it is almost certainly the case that many par-
tial systems of private prosecution are unacceptably unfair or ineffective as well. 
The more a suite of procedural concessions accommodates the prerogative of 
 
75. See generally Johanna Göhler, Victim Rights in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 267, 272-80 (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia Turner & Bettina Weisser 
eds., 2019); Brown, supra note 47, at 865-67. 
76. See Brown, supra note 47, at 865-67. 
77. For an overview of how American jurisdictions include victims in the criminal process, see 
Michael E. Solimine & Kathryn Elvey, Federalism, Federal Courts, and Victims’ Rights, 64 
CATH. U. L. REV. 909, 912-16 (2015). 
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crime victims, the closer it will approach the line between systems that achieve 
second-best conformity to principles of differential standing and systems that 
are intolerably unfair or ineffective. We cannot know the precise location of 
that line in a given procedural context without first knowing the facts thanks to 
which the system threatens to veer into unfairness or ineffectiveness. This 
means that we cannot say in general which combination of victim-empowering 
devices constitutes second-best conformity to principles of differential moral 
standing. 
conclusion: ways forward and ways out 
Criminal theorists who interrogate the moral standing of the state typically 
attend to the urgent but nonfoundational question of whether the state lacks 
standing to punish crimes arising from conditions of social and economic in-
justice. The ensuing discussions tend to assume that, but for the state’s alleged 
hypocrisy or complicity, its standing to prosecute and punish crime would be 
secure. This widely held assumption has been the chief target of my Essay. I 
have argued that the state engages in a kind of meddling when it calls individu-
als to account for their interpersonal wrongs through a criminal process that 
gives institutional form to moral accountability without sharing prosecutorial 
control with those most deeply aggrieved by the wrongs being punished. Prin-
ciples of differential standing familiar from ordinary life imply that a victim’s 
moral standing to call a wrongdoer to account is more robust and less contin-
gent than that of any third party, including the state and the polity it repre-
sents. Doubts about the state’s moral standing therefore should arise with par-
ticular vehemence with respect to a legal system like our own, which grants 
exclusive prosecutorial authority to the state while treating the criminal process 
as a way of calling people to account not only for wronging the public but also, 
paradigmatically, for wronging one another. 
I acknowledge that these doubts might rebound on the ideas from which 
they flow. As I said at the outset, we can view the argument of this Essay as a 
partial reductio ad absurdum—either of the relational system of exclusive public 
prosecution or of the victim-centered conception of differential standing. If the 
latter leads us to doubt the state’s standing to call people to account for para-
digmatic crimes, then we might conclude that the error lies not in our embrace 
of the relational model but in our fidelity to a conception of standing that plac-
es the victim above the community as a whole. For the victim-centered concep-
tion might err in excluding the possibility that collective third parties like hu-
man communities enjoy moral standing of a robustness and noncontingency 
surpassing that of any victim. If this possibility is the way things really are, 
what follows? Consider the fact that no human community of the size and po-
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tency of a polity can call individuals to account by informal means without 
risking unfairness and persecution. Perhaps any informal attempt by a large 
community to hold wrongdoers accountable will devolve into a transaction un-
dertaken by a lone third party or mere aggregate of third parties, rather than 
one undertaken by the entity that actually possesses superordinate standing, 
the community as a whole. These facts do not yet demonstrate the moral neces-
sity of the state, but they form the beginning of an argument for the moral ne-
cessity of a norm-bound system of accusation and answer—assuming of course 
that the victim-centered conception of differential standing is indeed unsound. 
If it is not unsound, then the doubts it arouses about the state’s standing to 
serve as prosecutor will persist unless we modify some aspect of the criminal 
process. Could we allay these doubts without discarding the relational model? 
As I argued in Part III, the problem of criminal standing does not arise from 
the bare fact that the polity qua accuser claims moral standing to hold its mem-
bers accountable for their interpersonal wrongs. Rather, the problem arises 
from the fact that, when the polity holds its members accountable through our 
existing institution of criminal law, the polity’s act takes on the character of a 
second-party (victim-driven) moral intervention, both in its harshness and in 
its primacy. A response to the problem of criminal standing therefore might 
seek to modify one or both of these aspects—the harshness of criminal pun-
ishment or the identity of the party that seeks and inflicts it. 
We have already considered two responses that modify the second aspect, 
the primacy of the state. One relatively drastic response is to cast the victim as 
lead or sole prosecutor in most or all cases of interpersonal wrongdoing, adopt-
ing a civil model of the criminal process akin to an enhanced version of the sys-
tem of routine private prosecutions that once prevailed throughout the West-
ern world. The civil model would achieve first-best conformity to the norm 
against meddling, but at the cost of intolerable inequity in the allocation of 
criminal punishment. A less morally dangerous approach is to give victims par-
tial control of the criminal process by adopting some or all of the victim-
empowering procedures I canvassed in Part IV. In theory, the right combina-
tion of victim-empowering procedures could avoid inequity while achieving 
second-best conformity to principles of differential standing. If the balance of 
reasons weighs decisively against full conformity, then second-best conformity 
through partial victim control would be better overall. Whether partial victim 
control would be best overall is another question. It depends not just on wheth-
er partial victim control is better than more drastic approaches that fully sup-
plant the primacy of the state. It depends also on whether partial victim control 
is better than an approach to the problem of criminal standing that targets the 
other aspect noted above, the harshness of punishment. 
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An approach that targets the harshness of punishment without upsetting 
the relational model or the primacy of the state might do one of two things: 
punish less, or not punish at all. By “punish less,” I mean reduce the severity of 
state punishment for interpersonal wrongdoing to a level where it conveys no 
more censure than the polity qua third party has moral standing to express. 
Given the communicative meaning of punishment in our culture, this approach 
could require us to punish far less harshly.78 It could in fact require that we 
punish many low-level crimes mildly or not at all, leaving us to control these 
crimes through noncarceral means if a conviction conveys all the censure that 
the polity qua third party has standing to express. The ultimate feasibility of 
this approach depends on a question subject to numerous moral and empirical 
contingencies—whether the state can sanction mildly enough to avoid convey-
ing more censure than it has standing to express while sanctioning severely 
enough to achieve the myriad other goals that the state generally pursues 
through punishment.79 
If the state cannot thread this needle, a (still more) hypothetical alternative 
is to stop punishing altogether, but to continue holding trials and accepting 
guilty pleas, and to subject those thus convicted to a morally neutral regime of 
public safety-oriented confinement and supervision. Our existing criminal legal 
system blends two very different functions: moral accountability and social 
control. Suppose we separated these functions by bifurcating adjudication and 
 
78. Many seem to believe that only a substantial term of incarceration could express the degree 
of censure appropriate for the most serious crimes. For my part, I am unconvinced that 
physically confining someone for many years is the only way to convey a message that we all 
seem able to express just as easily (and, indeed, more articulately) through mere speech. To 
say this much is not to advocate an approach to punishment in which “[w]rongdoers who 
harm others could suffer [nothing more than] a public tongue-lashing.” Bibas, supra note 
60, at 861. This consequence follows only if punishments harsher than a tongue-lashing 
necessarily convey more censure than the state has standing to express. Whether they do is a 
matter of how much censure given punishments convey in a particular cultural context, not 
a matter of whether the degree of censure thus conveyed could be expressed through other 
means. 
79. Bibas objects, id., that the “punish less” approach offends values of equity and proportionali-
ty by barring the state from sanctioning interpersonal wrongdoing as harshly relative to its 
seriousness as the state sanctions other varieties of wrongdoing relative to their seriousness. 
I disagree. The “punish less” approach doesn’t suppose that the only moral constraint on 
state punishment is that it may express no more censure than the state has standing to ex-
press. The “punish less” approach leaves room for other constraints, such as principles of 
proportionality and equity that demand that offenders of equivalent culpability receive 
equivalent punishment. In tandem with norms of differential standing, principles of propor-
tionality and equity might well require that the state punish violations of public order or risk 
creation less than fully (where punishing fully means imposing a sanction that conveys the 
maximum amount of censure that the state has standing to express). 
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disposition, with the further aim of cleaving censure from hard treatment. The 
result would be a quasi-criminal legal system in which the state holds offenders 
morally accountable through the adjudicatory process alone, sanctioning 
offenders through a subsequent procedure that adverts only to nonexpressive 
grounds for restricting people’s liberty. Resembling a combination of probation 
and civil commitment, this morally neutral dispositional procedure could serve 
various nonrelational interests connected to crime control without expressing 
moral censure and thus without functioning as the upshot of a calling-to-
account by the state. Of such a dispositional procedure, we might plausibly in-
sist that what is especially harsh is the disposition’s material aspect only, not the 
accountability relationship enacted by the adjudicative process that precedes 
it—not the accusation of wrongdoing, not the demand for an answer, and not 
the censure expressed by a criminal conviction. If the moral transaction be-
tween the state and a criminal offender truly ended with the judgment of con-
viction, criminal accountability would be no harsher than a jury verdict or a 
plea of guilty. With respect to its severity, third-party accountability in law 
would resemble third-party accountability in life. 
As a philosophical ideal, this last approach is in some respects the most at-
tractive: it mitigates the problem of criminal standing by combining moderate-
ness in carceral treatment with bureaucratic rationality and evenhandedness in 
the selection and prosecution of cases. As a practical proposal, it is probably the 
least promising: it lacks close precedent and requires us to change the social 
meaning of incarceration. Yet, for all its grandiose ambition, the last approach 
leaves undisturbed our apparent commitment to treating the criminal process 
as a way for the state to call people to account for serious interpersonal moral 
wrongs. In theory, we could abandon this commitment too: we could give up 
altogether on punishing offenders for interpersonal moral wrongs, and punish 
them instead only for victimless wrongs or wrongs they commit against the 
public. In the extreme, we could give up on punishing offenders for moral 
wrongs of any kind, and replace our morally inflected criminal legal system 
with a regulatory regime that does not portray violations as wrongful.80 Or we 
could leave everything else in place but abandon the idea that the state qua 
prosecutor acts on behalf of the polity—the “People”—and work instead to-
 
80. Less extreme departures from our current approach might portray violations as wrongful 
while administering a non-relational criminal process—for example, by implementing what 
Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard call a “clinical model of ‘responsibility without blame.’” Ni-
cola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, Why Standing to Blame May Be Lost but Authority to Hold Ac-
countable Retained: Criminal Law as a Regulative Public Institution, 104 MONIST 265, 267 
(2021). Their model places fundamental importance on rehabilitation, reintegration, and 
forgiveness, where “the basic rationale of the system is that of public regulation in the pur-
suit of distinctive civic goods, including, crucially, harm reduction.” Id. at 271. 
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ward a system in which the state acts in the name of the victim. Adherents of 
this quasi-Lockean81 approach would immediately confront the philosophical 
challenge of justifying the state’s claim to act in the name of many individuals 
who have not consented to the arrangement, a challenge not unlike one that 
will be familiar to all who have wrestled with the notion that citizens’ “hypo-
thetical” consent underpins the authority of the state.82 This considerable phil-
osophical difficulty is perhaps secondary to a more practical one: in our actual 
system, and in the idealized systems that relational theorists seek to justify, the 
state claims prosecutorial and penal authority in the name of the polity. Alt-
hough individual prosecutors sometimes seek to portray themselves (and the 
state) as the victim’s champion, a champion is not an agent or a fiduciary—a 
party bound by law to act on the victim’s behalf. Our existing legal order con-
ceives the state qua prosecutor as demanding unequivocally that offenders an-
swer to it and it alone for wrongs that they have done to others. 
If our current trajectory resembles any of the paths described above, it re-
sembles nothing more closely than an incipient and half-hearted attempt to bi-
furcate adjudication and disposition, albeit without denuding the latter of its 
moral content. The prevailing approach to criminal disposition is to fashion 
sentences based on every halfway plausible rationale for the practice of inflict-
ing criminal sanctions. Under American federal law, for example, the “[f]actors 
to be considered in imposing a sentence” include not only considerations relat-
ing to the appropriate degree of moral censure (“the seriousness of the offense,” 
its “nature and circumstances,” “the history and characteristics of the defend-
ant,” and the need “to provide just punishment”), but also a variety of aims 
more or less extrinsic to achieving moral accountability, aims such as “pro-
mot[ing] respect for the law; . . . afford[ing] adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; . . . protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant; . . . [and] provid[ing] restitution to . . . victims.”83 These considerations 
almost inevitably push a sentencing judge toward a penalty different from that 
which would convey the degree of moral censure that the polity qua third party 
has standing to express. 
If our existing approach to sanctioning offenders exacerbates the problem 
of criminal standing, however, it is not just because sentences are based in part 
on considerations extrinsic to condemnation and accountability. It is also be-
 
81. Locke argued that the state’s right to punish criminals derives from our natural right to pun-
ish anyone who invades the rights of others, a natural right we transfer to the government 
when we leave the state of nature. See LOCKE, supra note 27, at 271-76. 
82. On the difficulties faced by hypothetical social contract theory, see Ronald Dworkin, The 
Original Position, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 500, 519-28 (1973). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
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cause terms of incarceration are the output of a single procedure and imposed 
ultimately on the basis of a single legal ground: the criminal conviction. Imag-
ine an alternative regime with no sentencing process as such, but instead an in-
dependent dispositional mechanism authorized to impose terms of confine-
ment and other forms of supervision based on rigorous proof of their efficacy 
in achieving aims other than moral condemnation and accountability. If im-
plemented in good faith, this approach might solve the problem of criminal 
standing in the long term, despite the presumably recalcitrant social meaning 
of state-imposed confinement and supervision. This approach also might pro-
duce terms of confinement more reasonable and more rationally grounded than 
the criminal sentences our legal system now routinely imposes. Nonpenal 
terms of confinement and supervision would answer to independent standards 
and could take no moral cover from the fact of a criminal conviction. 
As long as state-imposed confinement and supervision are the upshot of a 
process of calling to account, all of us who are committed to the victim-
centered conception of moral standing should doubt the state’s purported 
standing to serve as exclusive criminal accuser. This doubt should lead us to re-
think our legal practices and possibly to change them—to punish less harshly, 
to require the state to share prosecutorial authority with crime victims, to work 
toward lessening incarceration’s expressive significance by cleaving it in whole 
or part from the process of adjudication, or to do something more radical still: 
to stop treating the criminal process as a means of holding offenders accounta-
ble to the polity for interpersonal wrongdoing. If we cannot make these chang-
es, or cannot justify them in light of their practical and moral costs, then per-
haps we should view our existing arrangement as a regrettable necessity. What 
we should not do is carry on as before, treating the criminal process as a site of 
moral reckoning while ignoring the possibility that the state’s sweeping asser-
tion of exclusive moral standing is ultimately unfounded. 
